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Whether it be in normal form games, or in fair allocations, or in voter preferences in voting systems,
a certain pattern of reasoning is common. From a particular profile, an agent or a group of agents
may have an incentive to shift to a new one. This induces a natural graph structure that we call
the improvement graph on the strategy space of these systems. We suggest that the monadic fixed-
point logic with counting, an extension of monadic first-order logic on graphs with fixed-point and
counting quantifiers, is a natural specification language on improvement graphs, and thus for a class
of properties that can be interpreted across these domains. The logic has an efficient model checking
algorithm (in the size of the improvement graph).
1 Introduction
A logical study of game theory aims at exposing the assumptions and reasoning that underlies the basic
concepts of game theory. This involves the study of individual, rational, strategic decision making be-
tween presented alternatives (in the non-cooperative setting). One potential form of reasoning in such
a situation is to envisage all possible strategic choices by others, consider one’s own response to each,
then others’ response to it in their turn, and so on ad infinitum, with Nash equilibrium representing
fixed-points of such iteration..
Such reasoning, which we might call improvement dynamics, is similar to but distinct from rational
decision making under uncertainty; it is also similar to but distinct from epistemic reasoning. The former
is about optimization, selecting the ‘best’ option in light of one’s information; the latter is about ‘higher
order information’ involving information about others’ information etc. Improvement dynamics intends
to yield the same end results as these, but operates at a more operational, computational level, and
reasoning about it can be seen as reasoning at the level of computations searching for equilibria. In
this sense, logic is seen as a succinct language for describing computational structure, rather than as a
deductive system of reasoning by agents. In spirit, the role of such logics is similar to that of logics
in descriptive complexity theory. If we were to talk of the descriptive complexity of game theoretic
equilibrium notions, it would need to account for the implicit improvement dynamics embedded in the
solution concept.
Interestingly, several contexts in social choice theory embed such improvement dynamics as well.
When we aggregate individual choices or preferences into social choices / preferences, or decide on social
action (like resource allocation) based in individual preferences, once again we see implicit improvement
dynamics. If a particular profile of voter preferences yields a specific electoral outcome, one can consider
a voter announcing a revised (and altered) preference to force a different outcome. Two agents might
exchange their allocated goods to move to a new allocation, if they perceive advantage in doing so.
Again, these can be seen as offers and counter-offers, perhaps leading to an equilibrium, or not. Some
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of these situations involve individual improvements, some (like pairs of agents swapping goods) involve
coalitions, but they have the same underlying computational structure.
In this paper, we suggest that monadic fixed-point logic (with counting) is a suitable language for
reasoning about this computational structure underlying games and social choice contexts. This is an
extension of first order logic with monadic least fixed-point operators and counting. In this, we follow
the spirit of descriptive complexity, where extensions of first order logics describe complexity classes.
Formulas offer concise descriptions of reasoning embedded in improvement dynamics.
Why bother? When we have a common language across contexts, we can employ a form of reasoning
common in one (say normal form games) in another (say fair resource allocations) and thus transfer
results and techniques. We show that the idea of improvement under swaps corresponds to certain form of
strong equilibria and coalitional improvement in games. Dynamics in iterated voting again correponds to
improvement dynamics in games. In such cases when the structures studied possess interesting properties
such as the finite improvement property or weak acyclicity we get certificates of existence of equilibria.
Interesting subclasses of games (such as potential games) possess such properties and by “transfer” we
can look for similar subclasses in social choice contexts, and vice versa.
The choice of monadic fixed-point logic is also motivated by the fact that it admits an efficient
model checking algorithm. Monadic least fixed point operator, iterating over subsets of strategy profiles,
suffices for improvement dynamics. Counting can help us constrain paths succinctly: though counting is
first order expressible, such expression would be prohibitively long.
Thus the contribution of this paper is modest and simple. The reasoning discussed is familiar, that
of improvement dynamics in normal form games, and expressing this in monadic fixed-point logic with
counting. In the process, we can study the same properties in different contexts, such as normal form
games, fair allocations and electoral systems. We also present a model checking algorithm for the logic.
Logic and game theory. Various logical formalisms have been used in the literature to reason about
games and strategies. Action indexed modal logics have often been used to analyse finite extensive form
games where the game representation is interpreted as models of the logical language [8, 5, 6]. A dynamic
logic framework can then be used to describe games and strategies in a compositional manner [33, 19, 34]
and encode existence of equilibrium strategies [22]. Alternating temporal logic (ATL) [1] and its variants
[23, 41, 12] constitute a popular framework to reason about strategic ability in games, especially infinite
game structure defined by unfoldings of finite graphs. These formalism are useful to analyse strategic
ability in terms of existence of strategies satisfying certain properties (for example, winning strategies
and equilibrium strategies). Some of the above logical formalism are also able to make assertions about
partial specifications that strategies have to conform to in order to constitute a stable outcome. In this
work we suggest a framework to reason about the dynamics involved in iteratively updating strategies
and to analyse the resulting convergence properties. [7] consider dynamics in reasoning about games
in the same spirit as ours and describe it in fixed-point logic. But crucially, the dynamics is on iterated
announcements of players’ rationality, and belief revision in response to it. Moreover, they discuss
extensive form games rather than normal form games. However, they do advocate the use of the fixed-
point extension of first order logic for reasoning about games.
Monadic least fixed point logic (MLFP) is an extension of first-order logic which is well studied in
finite model theory [38]. It is a restriction of first order logic with least fixed point in which only unary
relation variables are allowed. MLFP is an expressive logic for which, on finite relational structures,
model checking can be solved efficiently [15]. It is also known that MLFP is expressive enough to
describe various interesting properties of games on finite graphs. MLFP can also naturally describe
transitive closure of a binary relation which makes it an ideal logical framework to analyse the dynamics
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involved in updating strategies and its convergence properties. When α is a formula with one first order
free variable, Cxα ≤ k asserts that the number of elements in the domain satisfying α is at most k. Clearly,
this is expressible in first order logic with equality, but at the expense of succinctness. In the literature
on first order logic with arithmetical predicates [37], it is customary to consider two sorted structures to
distinguish between domain elements and the counts, but since our domain elements are always profiles,
there is no need for such caution.
It well known that a variety of contexts in the mathematical social sciences can be formulated in
terms of improvement dynamics leading to equilibria (of some kind). Our observation here is that the
deployment of the MLFPC logic can help to unify algorithmic techniques across these contexts. Rather
than devise an algorithm for each problem of this kind, definability in MLFPC can at once give a uniform
algorithm, which could then be fine-tuned. Admittedly when we present contexts as diverse as normal
form games, allocations in social choice theory or voting rules, all in one uniform framework, we only get
a broad-strokes description of the models, and the literature on these contexts vary widely in details. We
hope to convince the reader that a priori, the MLFPC has sufficient expressiveness to capture interesting
variations. Our hope is to delineate the logical resources needed to express the variations, but that will
require more work ahead.
2 The improvement graph structure
Improvement dynamics is a natural notion to study in the context of any situation involving strategic
interaction of agents. In this section we formalise this dynamics in terms of the data structure called
improvement graphs. We consider three specific application domains: strategic form games, voting
theory and allocation of indivisible items. We show how improvement graphs can be interpreted in these
applications and argue that the analysis of the structure acts as the basis for reasoning about strategic
interaction.
Let [n] = {1, . . . ,n} denote the set of n agents. Each agent is associated with a finite set of choices
Si. A profile of choices (one for each agent) induces an outcome in the strategic interaction. Let S denote
the set of all choice profiles, O denote the set of all outcomes and s(O) denote the outcome associated
with the profile s ∈ S. Each agent i ∈ [n] is associated with a preference ordering over the outcome set:
i⊆ (O×O). This ordering induces a preference ordering over profiles as follows: for s,s′ ∈ S and
i ∈ [n], s i s′ if s(O) i s′(O). For a choice profile s = (s1, . . . ,sn), we use the standard notation s−i to
denote the n−1 tuple arising from s in which the choice of agent i is removed.
The associated improvement graph is the directed graph G= (V,E)where V = S and E ⊆V× [n]×V .
We will denote the triple (s, i,s′) ∈ E by s→i s′. The edge relation E satisfies the condition: for i ∈ [n]
and s,s′ ∈ S, we have s→i s′ if s ≺i s′, si 6= s′i and s−i = s′−i. An improvement path in G is a maximal
sequence of profiles s1s2 · · · such that for every j > 0 there is a player k j such that s j →k j s j+1. Note
that here we use deviation by a single player to define the improvement graph. We could easily extend
the definition to deviation by a subset of players, this interpretation might be more relevant in certain
domains.
2.1 Strategic form games
A strategic form game is given by the tuple T = ([n],{Si}i∈[n],O,λ ,{i}i∈[n]) where the set of strategies
Si for agent i ∈ [n] can be viewed as its set of choices. For S = S1× ·· ·× Sn, the function λ : S→ O
associates an outcome to every strategy profile. In this paper, we consider only finite strategic form
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games. The notion of best response and Nash equilibrium are standard: si is best response to s−i if for
all s′i ∈ Si, λ (s)i λ (s′i,s−i); s is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ [n], si is best response to s−i. Existence
of Nash equilibrium and computation of an equilibrium profile (when it exists) are important questions
in the context of strategic form games.
Given a strategic form game T , let GT denote the improvement graph associated with T (as defined
above). Improvement paths in GT correspond to maximal sequence of strategy profiles that arise by
allowing players to make unilateral profitable deviations that result in improving their choice according
to their preference ordering. We say that a game has the finite improvement property (FIP) if every
improvement path in GT is finite [31]. In an improvement path, if each k j edge in the sequence is the
best response of agent k j to s
j−1
−k j then is called a best response improvement path. We can analogously
define the finite best response property (FBRP) if every best response improvement path is finite. FIP
not only guarantees the existence of Nash equilibrium, but also ensures the stronger property that a
decentralised local search mechanism convergences to a equilibrium outcome. Various natural classes
of resource allocation games like congestion games [36], fair cost sharing games and restrictions of
polymatrix games [2] are known to have the FIP.
A weakening of FIP was proposed by Young [42] which insists on the existence of a finite im-
provement path starting from any initial strategy profile. Classes of strategic form games that satisfy
this property are called weakly acyclic games. Note that weak acyclicity ensures that a randomised lo-
cal search procedure almost surely convergence to an equilibrium outcome [28]. Examples of classes
of games which has this property include congestion games with player specific payoff functions [30],
certain internet routing games [16] and network creation games [25].
As we can see, the improvement graph presents a data structure for analysing normal form games. It
captures the epistemic reasoning underlying player choices: if I were to consider a particular profile of
choices by all of us, I would rather choose another strategy to improve by my payoff; in that case, agent
j would revise her choice; and so on, unless we reach a profile from where none of us has any reason to
deviate. Such reasoning is closely related to pre-play negotiations studied by game theorists.
2.2 Voting systems
Consider an electorate consisting of a set [n] = {1, . . . ,n} of n voters and a set C of m candidates. Let R
be a voting rule that considers the preference of each voter over the candidates and chooses a subset of
winning candidates of size k (since k among m candidates have to be elected). The strategy sets for all
voters are the same S = L(C) = {pi|pi is a permutation of C}. The outcome set is O = (Ck). The voting
ruleR : Sn 7→O specifies which candidates win given the complete preferences of all voters. We assume
that each voter i has a preference ordering ≺i over the outcome set O. Thus the voting system can be
given by the tuple L = (n,m,≺1, . . . ,≺n,R).
The improvement graph GL associated with L is as before: GE = (V,E) where V = Sn, the set of
strategy profiles of voters; E ⊆ (V × [n]×V ) is the improvement relation for voter i, given by: s→i s′ if
R(s′)i R(s), si 6= s′i and for all j 6= i, s j = s′j.
Voting equilibria have been studied by Myerson and Weber [32]. In general, one speaks of the
bandwagon effect in an election if voters become more inclined to vote for a given candidate as her
standing in pre-election polls improve, or the underdog effect, if voters become less inclined to vote
for a candidate as her standing improves. Myerson and Weber suggest that equilibrium arises when the
voters, acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the
relative chances of candidates in contention for victory, generate an election result that justifies their
perceptions. Note that the improvement path again gives us the possibility of ‘interaction’ arising from
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voter preferences, and we can analyse this in the context of specific voting rules.
Given that agents may have incentive to strategically misreport their preferences, it is natural to
study the convergence dynamics when voting is modelled as a game. Iterative voting [26, 35, 29] is a
formalism that is useful to analyse the strategic dynamics when at each turn a voter is allowed to alter
her vote based on the current outcome until it converges to an outcome from which no voter wants to
deviate. In general, the outcome of iterative voting may depend on the order of voters’ changes. Again,
voters act myopically, without knowing the others’ preferences. This dynamics is again reflected by the
improvement path as discussed here and sink nodes correspond to Nash equilibria. Thus given a voting
rule, it is natural to ask what equilibria are reachable from a given vote profile.
2.3 Allocation of indivisible goods
An important problem often studied in economics and computer science is the allocation of resources
among rational agents. This problem is fundamental and has practical implications in various applica-
tions including college admissions, organ exchange and spectrum assignment. In this paper, we consider
the setting where there are [n] agents and a set A = {a1, . . . ,am} of m indivisible items. An allocation
pi : N → 2A such that ∪i∈[n]pi(i) = A and for all i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j, pi(i)∩ pi( j) = /0. In the most general
setting, each agent i has a preference ordering ≺i over the allocations. Thus an instance of an allocation
problem can be specified as a tuple H = ([n],A,{≺i}i∈[n]). Let Π denote the set of all allocations. In this
setting, each allocation pi can be viewed as defining an outcome and agents have a preference ordering
over such outcomes. In a typical allocation problem, it is often assumed that the preference ordering for
each agent i depends only on the bundle of items assigned to agent i. A special case of the above setting
is when n = m (i.e. the number of agents and the items are the same) and pi is required to be a bijection.
An instance of such an allocation problem A along with an initial allocation pi0 defines the well known
Shapley-Scarf housing market [39]. If agents are allowed to exchange items with each other, stability of
allocation is a very natural notion to consider. Core stable outcomes are defined as allocations in which
no group of agents have an incentive to exchange their items as part of an internal redistribution within
the coalition. The improvement graph structure can capture the dynamics involved in such a sequence
of item exchange in a natural manner. The associated improvement graph can be defined as GH = (V,E)
where V = Π. Since the deviation involves exchange of goods among a subset of players (rather than a
unilateral deviation by a single player), the edge relation is indexed with a subset u ⊆ [n]. That is, for
pi,pi ′ ∈ Π and u ⊆ [n], we have pi →u pi ′ if for all i ∈ u, pi(i) ≺i pi ′(i), pi(i) 6= pi ′(i) and for all j /∈ u,
pi( j) = pi ′( j).
A finite path in the improvement graph corresponds to a finite sequence of exchanges that converge
to a stable outcome. An important question is whether stable allocations always exist and whether a finite
sequence of exchanges can converge to such an allocation. For the housing market, it is known that a
simple and efficient procedure often termed as Gales Top Trading Cycle, can compute an allocation that
is core stable. The allocation constructed in this manner also satisfies desirable properties like strategy-
proofness and Pareto optimality.
The question of whether decentralised swap dynamics converges to stable allocation has been studied
in various related models of resource allocation. [14] analyses optimality in the setting where pairs of
agents exchange items or services. The influence of neighbourhood structures in terms of item exchange
and its influence on convergence to stable and optimal allocations is studied in [20, 13]. Exchange
dynamics with restricted preferences orderings are considered in [40, 17].
Note that the improvement graph here is different from the ones we discussed earlier in a crucial
sense. When agents in u swap goods, the allocation for other players outside [u] is unaffected. If each
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agent’s preference ordering depends only on the valuation of the bundle of items that the agent is allo-
cated then their satisfaction is unchanged. However, agent 1 may swap goods with 2 and then use some
the goods acquired to make a swap deal with 3 thus leading to interesting causal chains. In effect the en-
tire space of allocations may be tentatively explored by the agents and the interesting question is whether
they settle to an ‘equilibrium’. Again the improvement path offers interesting dynamics, and we can
ask whether from any allocation, we can reach one where no agent wishes to make a swap. In the case
where the preference orderings depend on externalities [10, 18] the situation is similar to what we ob-
served in the context of strategic form games. Apart from stability, notions of fairness like envy-freeness,
propotionality and maximin share guarantee are also well studied in the context of allocation of indivis-
ible items [11, 9]. Analysis of the improvement graph is also useful in the context of fairness notions.
Existence of a finite improvement path terminating in a fair allocation would indicate the possibility of
convergence to a fair allocation in terms of an exchange dynamics.
2.4 Remark
We have set up an improvement graph from three different models used in the mathematical social
sciences. This is of course so that a uniform logical language can be used to specify properties of all
these. One natural alternative to consider would be to translate all the models into one, games being
the natural choice, and then induce the improvement graph over the defined model. This is certainly
possible, but in general this can lead to an increase in the size of the graph. Moreover since we hope
to use MLFPC not only to unify these contexts but also differentiate them (in terms of logical resources
needed), such a reduction would not be helpful.
3 Monadic fixed-point logic with counting
In this section we present the monadic fixed-point and counting extension of first order logic interpreted
over improvement graphs. The use of the fixed-point extension is motivated by the fact that we wish
to express properties like acyclicity of the graph, which is not first-order expressible. As we will see
below, we need the fixed-point quantifier to range only over collections of nodes, and hence monadic
fixed-point quantifiers suffice for our purpose. The counting extension helps us to count nodes in a
subgraph, or along a path; this helps us express notions like fairness of schedules, which is of relevance
in specifying improvement dynamics.
An alternative formalism would be the transitive closure extension of first order logic. But as Grohe
has shown [21], monadic lfp logic is strictly less expressive than transitive closure logic, and hence we
prefer a minimal extension of first order logic that serves our purposes. Note that the counting extension
does not add expressivess but only succinctness. This is of use when we discuss concurrent deviation by
a subset of players.
3.1 MLFPC Syntax
Let σ be a first order relational vocabulary. Let (Si)i∈N be a sequence of monadic relation symbols, such
that for each i, Si 6∈ σ . These are the second order fixed-point variables of the logic.
The set of all MLFPC formulas, ΦMLFPC, can be defined inductively as follows:
• Every FO-atomic formula α over σ ∪{S1,S2, . . .} is an MLFPC formula.
fv1(α) = the set of first order free variables in α . fv2(α) = the set of all relation symbols Si
occurring in α; fv(α) = fv1(α) ∪ fv2(α).
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• If α,β are MLFPC formulas then so are, ∼ α , α ∧β and α ∨β .
fv(∼ α) = fv(α) and fv(α ∧β ) = fv(α ∨β ) = fv(α)∪ fv(β ).
• If α is a MLFPC formula, x ∈ fv1(α) and k ∈ N, then so are ∃xα , ∀xα and Cxα ≤ k.
fv(∃xα) = fv(∀xα) = fv(Cxα ≤ k) = fv(α)\{x}.
• If α is an MLFPC formula, Si ∈ fv2(α), x ∈ fv1(α), and u 6∈ fv1(α) and Si occurs positively in α ,
then [lfpSi,x α](u) is an MLFPC formula.
fv([lfpSi,x α](u)) = fv(α)\{Si,x} ∪{u}.
The restriction to positive second order variables in the lfp operator is essential to provide an effective
semantics to the logic. It is a standard way of ensuring monotonicity, given that we do not have an
effective procedure to test whether a given first-order formula is monotone on the class of finite σ -
structures [27].
It should be noted that the use of positive second order variables in no way restricts us to contexts
where equilibria are guaranteed to exist. Equilibria are given by graph properties, and these variables
allow us to collect sets of vertices monotonically.
3.2 MLFPC Semantics
To interpret formulas, we extend σ -structures with interpretations for the free first order and second order
variables (the latter from the given sequence (Si)i∈N). Let A be a σ -structure, which has domain A. The
semantics for the first order formulas of MLFPC are standard. The semantics for the count and the fixed
point operator are given below.
A |= Cxφ(x,~y)< k ⇐⇒ |{a ∈ A| A,x 7→ a |= φ}|< k
A,u 7→ a |= [lfpSi,xα](u) ⇐⇒ a ∈ lfp( fα)
where let, [lfpX ,xα](u) = β , fv(β ) = {x,y1, . . . ,yn,S1, . . . ,Sm}, fα is an operator such that, fα : ℘(A) 7→
℘(A) , B⊆ A, fα(B) = {a ∈ A | A,Si 7→ B,x 7→ a |= β}
The lfp quantifier induces an operator on the powerset of elements on the structure ordered by in-
clusion. The positivity restriction ensures that the operator is monotone and hence least fixed-points
exist.
3.3 Properties
Since the models of interest are improvement graphs, first order variables range over nodes in the graph,
monadic second order variables range over subsets of nodes and the vocabulary consists of binary rela-
tions Eu, where u ⊆ [n]. When |u| = 1 and u = {i}, we will simply write the relation as Ei. We write
formulas of the form E(x,y) to denote
∨
i ∈ [n]
Ei(x,y).
We now write special formulas that will be of interest in the sequel.
• sink(x) = ∀y.∼ E(x,y)
• trap(S,x) = ∀y.(E(y,x) =⇒ S(y))
• acyclic = ∀u.[lfpS,x trap](u)
• reach(S,x) = sink(x)∨∃y(E(y,x)∧S(y))
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• weakly−acyclic = ∀u.[lfpS,x reach](u)
Now consider the formulas interpreted over improvement graphs of normal form games. sink refers
to the set of sink nodes, and these are exactly the Nash equilibria of the associated game. The sentence
acyclic is true exactly when the improvement graph is acyclic and hence such games have the finite
improvement property (as every improvement path is finite). To see that the sentence captures acyclicity,
note the action of the lfp operator: at the zeroth iteration, we get all nodes with in-degree 0; we then get
all nodes which have incoming edges from nodes whose in-degree is 0; and so on. Eventually it collects
all nodes through which no path leads to a cycle. Since the sentence applies to every node, we infer that
the graph does not contain any cycle.
For weak acyclicity, we require that there exists a finite improvement path starting from every node.
Again the lfp operator picks up sink nodes at the zeroth iteration, then all nodes that have a sink node as
successor, and so on. Eventually it collects all nodes that start finite improvement paths. The sentence
asserts that every node has this property.
Note that these formulas capture equilibria, FIP and weak acyclicity on improvement graphs per se,
irrespective of whether they arise from normal form games, voting systems, or resource allocations. But
there were some differences in the way these graphs were generated, and we turn our attention to these
differences.
In improvement graphs of resource allocation systems, we defined the edge relation to be s→u s′,
where u ⊆ [n], if s[ j] = s′[ j] for j 6∈ u, ⋃i∈u s[i] = ⋃i∈u s′[i] and for all i ∈ u, s′[i] i s[i]. Note that an
analogous definition in the case of normal form games leads us naturally to a concurrent setting, and we
get what are called k-equilibria in coordination games.
Let s and s′ be strategy profiles in a normal form game, u⊆ [n]. Define s→u s′ when s[ j] = s′[ j] for
j 6∈ u, and for all i ∈ u, s′[i] i s[i]. That is, with the choices of the other agents fixed, the coalition of
agents in u can coordinate their choices and deviate to get a better outcome. Thus k-equilibria are nodes
from which no coalition of at most k agents can profitably deviate. We can then define a coalitional k
improvement path, where at each step a coalition of at most k agents deviate, which leads us further to a
k-FIP. [3] shows that a class of uniform coordination games has this property.
• sinku(x) = ∀y.∼ Eu(x,y)
• sinkk(x) = ∨
u⊆[n],|u|≤k
sinku(x)
• k− edge(x,y) = ∨
u⊆[n],|u|≤k
Eu(x,y)
• k− trap(S,x) = ∀y.(k− edge(y,x) =⇒ S(y))
• k−FIP = ∀u.[lfpS,x k− trap](u)
Note that the disjunctions are large, exponential in k. Since we have a counting operator, we could
add further structure to nodes, prising out the individual strategies of players and then use the counting
quantifier over these to get a succinct formula, linear in k.
Observe that these formulas apply to coalitions of k-agents performing swaps in resource allocation
systems and we thus uniformly transfer notions from the concurrent setting of games to resource allo-
cation systems as well. Proceeding further, we get a similar notion for voting systems, where again a
subset of voters can get together and agree on revising their expressed preferences, thus leading us to
coalitional improvement paths and coalitional FIP.
In general, we might want to specify reachability of a set of distinguished nodes satisfying some
property. For instance, in the context of allocation systems, we are interested in nodes that are envy free.
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An agent i envies an agent j at node x if there exists a node y such that yi x and the allocation for i at y
is the same as the allocation for j at x. A node is envy-free if no player envies another at that node. We
might then want to assert that an envy free node is reachable from any node. Note that we only need to
enrich the first order vocabulary to speak of x[i],y[ j] etc to express envy-freeness, and the lfp operator is
sufficient to specify reachability of such nodes.
• reachφ (S,x) = φ(x)∨∃y(E(y,x)∧S(y))
• φ − reachable = ∀u.[lfpS,x reach](u)
In the context of voting systems, a similar strengthening of the syntax of atomic formulas can lead to
amusing specification of reachability of singular profiles in which all voters have identical first and last
preference but disagree on all candidates ranked by them in between.
Further, the counting quantifier can give us interesting relaxations of improvement dynamics. For
instance consider the following specifications:
• reach(S,x) = sink(x)∨∃y(E(y,x)∧S(y))
• path− count =Cu([lfpS,x reach](u))< 5
This specifies that at most 5 nodes have finite improvement paths originating from them. Clearly,
such specifications are of greater interest in voting systems than in the others. Here the lfp operator is in
the scope of the counting quantifier. In the following specification, we have them the other way about.
• count− trap(S,x) =CyE(y,x)< k =⇒ (∀z.(E(z,x) =⇒ S(z)))
• special = ∀u.[lfpS,x count− trap](u)
Consider the housing market model mentioned in the previous section. This framework corresponds
to a resource allocation problem where a valid allocation corresponds to a bijection between agents and
resources and each agent is initially assigned an item. Stability is an important solution concept in this
setting. The dynamics in which agents start with the initial allocation and repeatedly exchange items
provided it is a profitable move for all the agents involved in the exchange is quite natural. The obvious
question is whether this process converges to a stable outcome. If we model the associated improvement
dynamics graph as exchange between pairs of agents then each action corresponds to resolving a blocking
pair. The sentence sink then refers to the existence of 2-stable outcomes and acyclic asserts that every
sequence of blocking pair leads to a 2-stable outcome. If we interpret the improvement dynamics graph
as capturing exchange of items within a coalition of agents then these sentences correspond to existence
and convergence to core-stable outcome. For the housing allocation problem, the existence of core-stable
outcome is guaranteed by the Top Trading Cycle algorithm. There are variants of the housing allocation
problem where stable outcomes are not always guaranteed to exists (for instance, in the presence of
externalities). In this case, by using the counting quantifier, we can make interesting assertions like the
number of nodes that have finite improvement paths originating from them.
4 Model Checking Algorithm
In this section we discuss the model checking problem for MLFPC. Given φ ∈ΦMLFPC and a σ -structure
A, the model checking problem is to check if A |= φ . We show that the logic admits an efficient model
checking procedure (Algorithm 1). The main idea is to use the model checking algorithm for FO and
modify it accordingly for the newly introduced quantifiers of the count and the least fixed point.
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Algorithm 1 for Checking of A |= φ
Input : A,φ
Output : Sol ⊆ Afv1(φ)
Subφ = { subformulas of φ} /* ordered via subformula ordering ≤s */
Q = {qα | α ∈ Subφ}
for α ∈ Subφ
switch type of α
i. case α is an atomic formula
qα is computed by reading off the structure A
ii. case α =∼ β
qα is just the negation of qβ /*since β ≤s α, qβ is already computed */
iii. case α = β1∧β2
Let P = fv1(β1)∩ fv1(β2), Q = fv1(β1)\P, R = fv1(β2)\P
for~x ∈ A|P|,~y ∈ A|Q|,~z ∈ A|R|
if qβ1(~x,~y) = 1 and qβ2(~x,~z) = 1
qα(~x,~y,~z) = 1
else qα(~x,~y,~z) = 0
iv. case α = ∃yβ
for~x ∈ A|fv1(α)|,a ∈ A
if qβ (~x,a) = 1
qα(~x) = 1
v. case α =Cyβ ≤ k
Let count = 0
for~x ∈ A|fv1(α)|
for a ∈ A
if qβ (~x,a) = 1 then count = count + 1
if count ≤ k then qα(~x) = 1
count = 0
vi. case α = [lfpSi,x β ](u)
lfp(α) /*subroutine call */
Algorithm 2 : lfp(α) - Subroutine call for computing the least fixed point
Input : α = [lfpSi,x β ](u)
Output : qα
Let fv(β ) = {x,~y,Si,~Y} , fv(α) = {u,~y,~Y}
for~a ∈ A|~y|
iter = {}, f~aβ = {}
do
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iter = f~aβ
/* call to a FO-model checking procedure, where the second order variables are
fixed */
f~aβ = {b ∈ A | A,Si 7→ f~aβ ,x 7→ b,y 7→~a |= β}
for a ∈ A
if a ∈ f~aβ then qα(~a,a) = 1
while f~aβ 6= iter
Theorem 1. Given φ and A, Algorithm 1 decides if A |= φ in polynomial time.
Proof. Given ϕ ∈ΦMLFPC, let Subϕ denote the set of subformulas of ϕ and≤s denote the corresponding
subformula ordering. The idea follows the algorithms outlined for model checking procedures in FO and
combines with what is known about the least fixed point. We maintain a polynomial time computable
relational list Q of polynomial size. We will basically follow the proof of the first order logic and argue
similarly for the count and least fixed point operators introduced. Let A be the underlying domain of A.
For each α ∈ Subφ let qα : Afv1(α) 7→ {0,1} where qα(~a) = 0 if A,~x 7→~a 6|= α and qα(~a) = 1 otherwise.
Induction Hypothesis. For all α ∈ Subφ , Qα is of size |A|O(1) and can be computed in time |A|O(1).
Base Case. When α is an atomic formula, then Qα can be directly computed from A. Since each
of the relations defined in A are polynomial in the size of A and it would take a linear pass across the
relations expressed to compute Qα . Thus, we can conclude that the total time taken is also polynomial
in the size of A.
Induction Case.
• α =∼ β By, I.H, since β ≤s α , we would have already computed Qβ . Qα = Afv1(α) \Qβ which
can be computed by an algorithm running in time |A|fv1(α).
• α = β1∧β2 By, I.H. we have in polynomial time been able to maintain the polynomial sized lists
Qβ1 and Qβ2 . Then the procedure outlined in the algorithm would take time |A|fv
1(α) and maintains
a list of similar size.
• α = ∃xβ By, I.H. we have in polynomial time been able to maintain the polynomial sized lists Qβ .
The algorithm outlined would take O(Afv
1(β )) which would also happen to be the size of the list
maintained by Qβ .
• α =Cxβ ≤ k By, I.H. we have in polynomial time been able to maintain the polynomial sized lists
Qβ . The outlined procedure computes Qα in time O(Afv
1(β )).
• α = [lfpSi,x β ](u) First we note, fv(β ) = {x,~y,Si,~Y}, fv(α) = {u,~y,~Y} and |fv1(α)| = |fv1(β )|.
What essentially happens here is that the second order variable Si gets used to generate an inductive
relation via the fixed point computation and the newly introduced first order variable u is utilised to
check validity of these formulas. So, unfortunately we cannot directly use Qβ to give a polynomial
time procedure to generate Qα . We would rather use the fact that the least fixed point computation
is a polynomial time computation even in the case of the first order logic with the count introduced.
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If we look at the inductive procedure to compute the fixed point we see that the monadic fixed
point operator starts at an empty set and then converges to a subset of A. And at each stage there
is an increment in the number of elements of the output set by at least 1. Therefore this will run in
maximum O(|A|) time. Now for the call to model checking at each stage we notice that since the
formulas get fixed values assigned at each model checking call, we actually operate a FO-model
checking call, which we know happen to take O(A|β |) time. We have a precomputation of Qβ ,
which we can additionally make use of to reduce the time in the following manner.
For each choice of b ∈ A the entire instance gets fixed and in thus a linear pass through |β | we
would get to know whether the choice of b satisfies the formula or not. Therefore each stage
that does the FO-model checking would take time at most O(|β |). Therefore total time taken by
the entire lfp computation part is O(A|fv
1(α)|× |β |). We are interested in the data complexity of
our procedure, where we can ignore the size of the formula, which typically happens to be of
lesser size than the model over which the model checking procedure is held (reflects the practical
circumstances). So we can conclude that our procedure runs in time O(A|fv
1(α)|).
Complexity of Algorithm 1. The algorithm iterates over all subformulas in increasing order. The
worst case running time of the lfp procedure for inputs A= (A,Ei, . . .) and φ is O(A|fv
1(α)| · |φ |2), where
|fv1(α)| = max {|fv1(α)| | α ∈ Subφ}. Thus the running time of Algorithm 1 is O(A|fv1(α)| · |φ |2). For
the specific properties mentioned in section 3.3, note that the corresponding MLFPC formulas refers to
one second order variable and two first order variables. Thus for all the properties mentioned in section
3.3, the model checking procedure runs in time O(A2 · |φ |2).
In the context of improvement graphs, if there are n agents and at most m choices for each agent,
the size of the associated improvement graph is O(mn). Since it is possible to have a compact repre-
sentation for certain subclasses of strategic form games, for instance, polymatrix games [24], the size of
the improvement graph structure can be exponential in the representation of the game. Thus the model
checking procedure, while polynomial on the size of the underlying improvement graph, can in princi-
ple, be exponential in the size of the game representation. This observation may not be very surprising
since even for restricted classes of games like 0/1 polymatrix games, checking for the existence of Nash
equilibrium is known to be NP-complete [4].
5 Discussion
We see this paper as a preliminary investigation, hopefully leading to a descriptive complexity theoretic
study of fundamental notions in games and interaction. It is clear that fixed-point computations underlie
the reasoning in a wide variety of such contexts, and logics with least fixed-point operators are natural
vehicles of such reasoning. We expect that this is a minimal language for improvement dynamics, but
with further vocabulary restrictions that need to be worked out. Proceeding further, we would like to
delineate bounds on the use of logical resources for game theoretic reasoning. For instance, one natural
question is the characterization of equilibrium dynamics definable with at most one second order (fixed-
point) variable.
Expressiveness needs to be sharpened from the perspective of models as well. We would like to char-
acterize the class of improvement graphs for different subclasses of games, resource allocation systems
and voting rues, considering the wide variety of details in the literature. This would in general necessaite
enriching the logical language and we wish to consider minimal extensions.
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Another important issue is the identification of subclasses that avoid the navigation of huge improve-
ment graphs. Potential games provide an interesting subclass and they correspond to some appropriate
allocation rules and forms of voting (under specific election rules). But these are only specific exempli-
fying instances, studying the stucture of formulas and their models will (hopefully) lead us to many such
correspondences.
An important direction is the study of infinite strategy spaces. Clearly the model checking algorithm
needs a finite presentation of the input but this is possible and it is then interesting to explore convergence
of fixed-point iterations.
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